1	SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
2	COUNTY OF NEW YORK: TRIAL TERM PART 3
3	X
4	KRUNCHCASH, LLC, KC PCRD LLC,
5	JEFFREY HACKMAN, SEAN McGHIE PLC,
6	Plaintiffs,
7	- against -
8	PURSUIT CREDIT SPECIAL OPPORTUNITY FUND, L.P., MITCHELL COHEN, J. SCOTT TURNER and YALE FERGANG,
9	Defendants.
LO	X
11	Index No. 656688/2021
12	September 28, 2022 60 Centre Street
L3	New York, New York 10007
L 4	B E F O R E: THE HONORABLE JOEL M. COHEN, Justice
15	APPEARANCES:
16	ROBINS KAPLAN LLP Attorneys at Law
L 7	1325 Avenue of the Americas, Suite 2601 New York, New York 10019-6026
18	BY: GABRIEL BERG, ESQ.
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20	420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 2525 New York, New York 10170
21	BY: RENEE BEA, ESQ. EVAN FRIED, ESQ.
22	KIMBERLY GRINBERG, ESQ.
23	
24	
25	Terry-Ann Volberg, CSR, CRR Official Court Reporter

1	THE COURT: Good afternoon.
2	Let's start with appearances beginning with the
3	plaintiff.
4	MR. BERG: Good afternoon, your Honor.
5	Gabriel Berg of Robins Kaplan for the KrunchCash
6	parties.
7	THE COURT: Good afternoon.
8	For the defendants.
9	MS. BEA: Good afternoon, your Honor.
LO	Renee Bea representing Pursuit Credit Special
11	Opportunity Fund LP. In one action we are the plaintiff and
12	in the other we are the defendant.
13	THE COURT: That's right.
L 4	Let's remember, let's use the mics today, and the
15	arguments are going to be at the podium.
L6	MS. BEA: I apologize.
L 7	We also represent in the action captioned with the
18	Index 656688/2021 Mitchell Cohen and Scott Turner.
19	THE COURT: Okay, right.
20	So we have two actions and we have one motion in
21	each of the two. I did, in my quest to simplify today,
22	which didn't work out, misperceived the discovery motion so
23	I will hear that again today since I read it as covering the
24	discovery against the banks that is being pursued in

Florida, and I understand now, based on Ms. Bea's letter,

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that, in fact, the motion was a discovery request to the defendants in the 651070 action; yes?

MS. BEA: Correct.

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THE COURT: Let's do that one first to make sure I don't forget it.

So cutting to it, I do see a need for, I understand the need for the information and it's within the broad scope of discovery. What my quest is for is, you know, obviously it seeks all banking information, a wide array of banking information for a number of years, and obviously a request like that will inevitably bring in lots of transactions that have nothing to do with this case and that involve uninvolved third parties, and I am, just to be open about it, looking for a way to protect those interests while at the same time providing what Pursuit legitimately needs to do the money tracing kind of activity that it has in mind.

So I don't know if it's Ms. Bea, why don't you start with that premise that I do see, given the nature of the allegations which, you know, obviously you are subject to a motion to dismiss which I am not hearing today, but life goes on, some need for this kind of discovery, but it seems to me very broad both as to the number of years to some extent, and redaction may be something that we have to think about.

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1 MS. BEA: Thank you, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Turn the mic on.

MS. BEA: What's that?

THE COURT: Hit the button on the bottom of the mic.

MS. BEA: I see.

Thank you, your Honor.

So to respond to your question which I understand to be how can we deal with this disclosure in a way that protects the interests of potentially other parties whose transactions may not be directly relevant, it's important to I think frame the answer to that question in the context of the burden that has to be shown in order to prevent that disclosure.

First of all, you know, to be clear, the kind of records we are seeking are bank statements, but also wire transaction statements, manually maintained ledgers prepared by defendant Hackman, and documents sufficient to show the identity of the payees and source of funds corresponding to those transactions, and I will explain why we need all of those pieces of information.

Defendants come before this court presenting heavily redacted bank records, that we have everything we know of to produce to Pursuit Funds, but what they are really showing you is a summary of the amounts that Pursuit

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invested into the KC PCRD and KrunchCash bank accounts.

That is not really disputed, but what is disputed and what is concealed by the improper redactions are transactions, for example, showing the amounts that were actually advanced to third-party recipients it advanced, whether or not KrunchCash actually invested capital alongside Pursuit as it represented it did, whether and when repayments actually occurred —

THE COURT: The only transactions that you need to trace would be, you know, again, you have the ones in from your client, but it would be anything out to the specific parties in the litigation that your client was supposedly helping to finance, right?

MS. BEA: That is a piece of it. We also need to see -- Mr. Hackman prepared ledgers that we have determined, and we have submitted an expert affidavit showing this preliminary analysis is completely irreconcilable with ledgers that were prepared for other investors and ledgers that were presented under oath to courts in Maryland and in Florida purporting to show the amounts of money that went out to the advance recipients and the amounts that were then owed based on those amounts. We see double accounting of principal, we see evidence that claims were returned. So just to get on a granular level, we can't tell for individual claim to claim whether \$800 went out, for

example, to the law firm that borrowed the money or \$1,800 went out to the law firm which is what is represented to the courts in Florida and Maryland, and there's no real way to tell that until we get, you know, a crack at the books.

Now the real issue is should we put the determination of deciding what is relevant and what is not relevant in the hands of someone that Pursuit has not only credibly alleged has been misrepresenting the nature, amount, source of those transactions and monies, but who's alleged to have defrauded our client, Pursuit, by using these misrepresented versions of the accounting for the various investments.

We also need to know, for example, where were these purported repayments coming from that Mr. Hackman represents were coming in when he says a million dollars of repayments came in. Was that money actually coming out of insurance proceeds on the Pharma, pharmaceutical receivables advances? Was it actually law firm revenue or was it what we think it was which was another investor called Signal Funding when they were putting their capital in, you know, that money was apparently to us being applied, based on timing, to pay out our positions and then purportedly issue new advances.

THE COURT: I see.

MS. BEA: So putting the redaction responsibility

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in the hands of the person alleged of fraud is frankly not
the law, it's not what we are supposed to do, and the better
use of sort of the mechanisms and tools that the Court has
is to impose a protective order which we have been asking
for, for some time, the parties have stipulated to, and it
has an "attorneys' eyes only" designation. If the
concern

THE COURT: Has it not been signed by me yet?

MR. BERG: It hasn't been signed by you yet, but
the parties I think, you know, have agreed on the treatment
of documents, and it includes an "attorneys' eyes only"
designation that can clearly be used for any records where
purported third-party privacy interests are at stake. On
that point, your Honor, New York does not recognize a
privacy interest, by the way, in those various individuals.
These are bank records, in the bank's hands, and here they
are KrunchCash and KC PCRD's business records.

THE COURT: I think we do recognize the interests of third parties --

MS. BEA: We can recognize -- sorry.

THE COURT: -- who have nothing to do with this.

MS. BEA: I think we can recognize that perhaps those parties regard the information as sensitive. We have no objection to that information being designated as confidential, and where it's appropriate and third-party

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information is actually sensitive information, is actually being included, then an "attorneys' eyes only" designation will take care of that. That would limit disclosure to the attorneys, it would limit disclosure to the experts that need to review and analyze that data, and when it comes to trial through, you know, other disclosure, deposition, through hopefully cooperation with opposing counsel, we will be able to identify the actual transactions that are at issue.

THE COURT: Temporally you go back to 2017. My understanding is that there was an audit in 2019. Why do you need to go back to recover some of that time period that was already audited?

MS. BEA: I would like to address that audit.

First of all, it is false, the statement that there was an audit for the year 2018 performed in 2019. I have the affidavit of Mr. Kenneth Parzygant who the KrunchCash parties claim was the auditor stating unequivocally not only that there was no audit performed, but critically that the financial review that Pursuit was trying to perform on its investments could not be performed because KrunchCash refused to provide its bank accounts.

I have provided that affidavit to Mr. Berg, it was served to him on Monday in connection with the banking subpoena. I would be happy to provide the Court with a

1	copy, as well.
2	THE COURT: I was wondering why it didn't sound
3	familiar.
4	MR. BERG: I am sorry, I haven't seen this.
5	When was it filed?
6	MS. BEA: It was filed on Monday.
7	MR. BERG: In which court?
8	MS. BEA: In Florida.
9	THE COURT: Not in this court?
LO	MS. BEA: Not in this court because, your Honor,
L1	when your order was issued I didn't think it was proper to
12	submit additional submissions at that time, but the parties
L3	were served with this affidavit on Monday. I had given
L 4	Mr. Berg a copy before these proceedings so he could review
15	it, and I am happy to give the Court a copy.
16	THE COURT: Just now?
L 7	MR. BERG: Yes, I have just seen this. Of course
18	I object, it has not been e-filed in this court.
L9	THE COURT: Let me hear Mr. Berg's response.
20	MS. BEA: May I complete my response?
21	You asked why do I need more when there was an
22	audit in 2018?
23	THE COURT: If there wasn't an audit
24	MS. BEA: If there wasn't an audit, there wasn't

an audit, but, in addition, in 2018 -- first of all, why

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2017?

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The advances, the transactions that would show how much money actually went to some of these advance recipients, would have happened in the year prior to some of the funded transactions coming in from the investors. So that is why we go back to the 2017.

In addition, anything done in 2018 wouldn't address Pursuit's need for information relating to the fact that the investments were collapsing in 2019, and repayments were coming in that Mr. Hackman was collecting as some kind of like use fee for himself and not paying to Pursuit. It wouldn't address additional recoveries achieved through the default actions and through other settlements in 2020 and '21 that, again, Pursuit's position is should have been paid to Pursuit. It doesn't address KrunchCash's collection of proceeds from other investments that Pursuit has invested in, but it doesn't even dispute it owes to Pursuit and it collected in 2022.

It's claim is that it's maintaining that in an account, it's not maintaining it in the KC PCRD account. They showed that in submissions, in other papers to the Court. So to confirm it's in the KrunchCash account we would like to look at those records.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Try to keep it brief so that we can get to the

next one.

MR. BERG: I will be brief. I do need to respond to the premise here.

Your Honor, your order was actually clear because the relief they ask for is for you to make a relevancy determination that they can then take down to Florida. If you look at their brief, there isn't anywhere in it, here's the response that we find deficient, here's what we are complaining about, and so, therefore, we need these documents.

Your Honor's --

THE COURT: But this motion relates to a discovery request made to your clients, not to the banks.

MR. BERG: That is true, however, --

THE COURT: My order assumed it was the discovery request to the banks.

MR. BERG: All I'm saying, it wasn't the Court's fault because this is what they asked for. The relief was that we need a relevancy determination to take down to Florida. That's right on page three of their brief.

Let me move to the more important points.

First of all, they can't prove any of the allegations, and we have defeated the allegations with documentary evidence, the key ones.

I would submit to your Honor, the Hackman

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affidavit actually goes through chapter and verse. For example, they say they are owed 2.5 million which KrunchCash collected in plain view in bankruptcy court, and nobody objected. There was a trustee, everybody knew where this money was going, and they say he stole some 2.5 million. That's just false.

There are three other critical allegations that we disprove in this motion. Here's what we offered them because they are overstating what they know. This is the danger in a motion like this before an ounce of discovery is taken. We've said we will give you all unredacted KC PCRD bank records, we will give you redacted KrunchCash bank records, redacted because most of the transactions, a lot of them will have nothing to do with Pursuit, and the allegation that somehow money's going in the wrong direction, we will uncover where Pursuit's money went to a tee. That's how we can protect the other third parties who have, most of whom have a confidentiality provision in their contracts.

THE COURT: What about the money flowing back in from, I don't know whether you call them borrowers or not, but how do we trace that?

MR. BERG: Easily. Here is where they will unfortunately be upset to learn that money that goes into KrunchCash then goes to KC PCRD. KrunchCash runs its

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business with special purpose vehicles with an operating agreement at the center. Money in always ends up in KC PCRD, money out goes through KrunchCash because KrunchCash had the contract with the underlying third parties against whom the defendants are searching to trace. They will see all of that.

And most importantly, your Honor, it is the way to protect third parties, and if I'm wrong, they come back and say we can't account for all the money, then they will know more because what they are doing now is speculating. They put in an affidavit from an expert who says I have not seen much, but here's what I can conclude.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this: So there's certain documents that you have agreed to produce, but have not yet produced?

MR. BERG: That's correct because they don't want them until this is over for some reason. We are going to give them to them. All the KC PCRD are unredacted, they can have them, they can see all of that, and KrunchCash is redacted to protect investors who have nothing to do with this action.

THE COURT: What your plan would be is for them to get it all, get what you are willing to give them, try it, and come back to me if it turns out that the redactions make it useless.

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MR. BERG: Yes, that's exactly what I am suggesting because it protects the third parties, and I think they will be disappointed.

THE COURT: I guess that's their fear, not quite the way you mean it.

MR. BERG: Disappointed in the following way: To this day their principal has said to my principal privately, despite this action I know you have accounted for all of the money, you always have, he said that privately, and that's in the affidavit, as well. That's an important point because there was trust between these two friends, and there still is in some respect because my client has a background in accounting. He accounts for everything meticulously, and their principal, Mr. Cohen, knows that.

THE COURT: That's Mr. Hackman?

MR. BERG: Yes, sir.

The last point I would make, your Honor, is the affidavit that the defendants want to introduce is, parses too finely. They are saying is there was not an audit performed, but this Kenneth, I don't know how to pronounce his last name, Parzygnat, testified that he accounted for all new funds up to 7.8 million, I believe, as of 2019, he had accounted for all of that money. It might not be a formal audit, but it certainly was accounted for, and his declaration makes it inconsistent with what is in this

record which is his writing saying I have accounted for all this money, call me if you don't understand.

E-mails --

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THE COURT: Do we have a hearing date yet for the motion to dismiss this case, the Pursuit case?

MR. BERG: I don't believe we do, no.

MS. BEA: Your Honor, if I may be heard before you decide.

THE COURT: Okay, just briefly.

MS. BEA: First of all, Mr. Berg, and on behalf of his clients, has published his version of what we should accept as useful and reasonable in connection with the motion to dismiss in the other action. I have provided that to the experts who submitted an affidavit telling you it does not tell them anything.

THE COURT: They have looked at the actual raw material or just the description of it?

MS. BEA: They have looked at the redacted KrunchCash records and the KC PCRD bank records. They were filed as an exhibit to the motion that we don't have a hearing yet for.

THE COURT: So it has already been produced?

MS. BEA: It has been published. Like I said, no documents have been produced through disclosure, no Bates stamped production has been provided, and I would welcome it

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because we asked for it in June. However, they have published it in the way they would like it presented to support their motion to dismiss the other action.

What they are confusing and what they are collapsing together here is the difference between, look, if you look in this special account that we created, when we put money in there it matches up with our representation to you about how much money was put in there. That's not the question. The question is, whose money was that? Was it Signal Funding who provided an affidavit in support of our motion to compel saying our privacy interests are not a concern? We want to know where our money went.

THE COURT: Let me ask you, putting accounting propriety aside, if, in fact, the tracing will show that your client got back what it was entitled to, you know, other agencies might be interested to know whether money was tracing the right way, but what would the harm be to your client?

MS. BEA: Our clients did not receive any money back. These were paper profits, paper transactions. At the end of that paper trail is a big zero where our clients have never got their principal back. All they have are some representations about where all that principal went.

When you triangulate that and compare that with this other investor, again, Signal Funding submitted an

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affidavit in support of our motion saying we welcome Pursuit having access to transactions that might have pertained to our investments because from what we can see claims were being churned so that we were being paid back by investor number two's money, investor number two goes into that same hole, but it will not come back in terms of repayment.

It may look like repayment on the ledgers. Again, ledgers, I use that term very loosely here because these are Excel spreadsheets prepared by Mr. Hackman manually, and he may be meticulous about how he manually prepares the detail in this, and that is the basis for some of our fraud allegations, that the misrepresentations were so detailed down to the claim level, but when you go back and compare it to sworn statements he made in front of other judicial bodies in his deposition testimony in other actions it does not add up. When he was talking to our clients he is telling us things were repaid. Now in this other case over and over again he is saying no, no, no, they were short on all of those claims. He's always got some explanation.

This is disclosure, and in a New York civil litigation that involves \$10 million of investments that have gone into thin air, Pursuit, as the plaintiff, is entitled to make its own investigation of where its money went, and we shouldn't even have to be talking about evidence and affidavits on the pleadings alone.

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We have alleged sufficient facts to warrant disclosure of those records, but we have gone one further for the Court to give you confidence, to show you that even though we gave an expert the redacted KrunchCash bank records that really don't convey any information at all about where money was coming from or whether money was lent out to the appropriate parties or even used for the purpose our clients thought it was being used for, that's all redacted so our expert can't figure out if these things tie out.

THE COURT: Yeah, I think I get it.

Let me turn to the other motion and I will give you a response on this one at the end.

MS. BEA: Will your client, I am happy to e-file it, accept the affidavit of Mr. Parzygnat in support of our motion?

I think it's useful to the Court, but also

Mr. Berg has accused me of lack of candor to the Court, and

I take that accusation in his brief seriously. This is what

he bases it on, he says there was an audit, so I think that

the affidavit of Mr. Parzygnat is relevant for that purpose.

THE COURT: You can supplement.

Let's turn to the motion to dismiss in the other action, in the 656688 action. I guess you're back up on your feet.

1 MS. BEA: Different papers.

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THE COURT: We will try to -- as you have heard, I have another hearing at 3:30. Let's try to stick to ten, 15 minutes a side.

MS. BEA: Yes.

The question on this motion to dismiss the KrunchCash parties' complaint is whether the KrunchCash parties' amended pleading has set forth a viable cause of action against Pursuit or its individual principals, Mitchell Cohen and Scott Turner. We submit it does not.

THE COURT: I know you can spend a long time on the procedural morass, usually that's the easy part of the brief to read, this part gave me a headache, but I think I understand it. Go right to the merits.

MS. BEA: I won't go through how we got here with all the cases, but it is important to note that this particular action was filed in an attempt to get declaratory judgments to negate claims that Pursuit brought in the Florida case and that are now before this court in this separately captioned action.

When I refer to the KrunchCash parties, I mean Mr. Hackman, KrunchCash and the KC PCRD fund. Sean McGhie is also a purported plaintiff in this case, however, there are no allegations pertaining to him in the entire complaint beyond the residence, his current residence being in

1 Colorado.

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Moving on, the declaratory judgments should be dismissed, the request for declaratory judgment should be dismissed because they're duplicative of the Pursuit action which involves the same parties and deals with the same issues.

THE COURT: Would you agree that, because I get these all the time, if the declaratory judgment action is, in fact, brought first, even though it's anticipatory, one might argue that's not by itself a basis to dismiss it. Here the Court gives -- as I understand it, your client brought the affirmative claims initially in a different court, it is now here having been dismissed on jurisdiction grounds, but you fired the first shot, they fired a responsive shot here, and that's the basis for the argument that there is really no reason to keep those claims outstanding. It obviously does not make sense to have all of these claims being litigated at the same time because they are essentially mirror images of each other.

MS. BEA: Right. Well, I can make it easier for you. It does not matter who was first filed. Courts in New York generally will not even give priority to a first filed action where the declaratory judgment action is filed defensively to preempt an action at law, and that because there are two bases upon which the declaratory judgment

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requests should be dismissed. One is this mirroring issue --

THE COURT: I get your point. The way I see it sometimes is where it's a race to the courthouse, and where it really should be in New York, and the punitive plaintiff goes to some home district, and then sometimes cases will go on at the same time.

MS. BEA: In our reply, page 17, we cite numerous cases in New York that recognize in that situation you give credit to the actions at law and in equity because a declaratory judgment request is an alternative remedy when those are not available.

THE COURT: This whole thing does not really make all that much substantive difference, right? In other words, this just determines who the plaintiff is, but the claims will be here one way or the other whether they are in your case or in this case.

MS. BEA: No, the declaratory judgment claims do matter because when it does come for a trial we can spend time with them now or they can assert them as affirmative defenses which is what they really are in the other action, and we can deal with them that way as they should be before the jury where we are entitled to a jury on some of these causes of action. A request for declaratory judgment is fundamentally a request that the Court decides on undisputed

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facts what parties should think about, for example, a contract going forward.

THE COURT: It's not necessarily undisputed facts. You can bring a declaratory judgment action and have a trial.

MS. BEA: Yes, of course, practically speaking, yes, but as a remedy it's intended to be used to declare prospective rights on a relatively static set of facts.

THE COURT: Your point is that the substance is that the fact finder is not a jury under that scenario.

MS. BEA: Correct, correct.

THE COURT: I got it.

MS. BEA: I will move on to the three claims that were added against Pursuit and against individual defendants in the amendment.

First, as to the fraud claim, promises to pay are not actionable as fraud, and the amended complaint makes it clear that all of the promises that are alleged to have been misrepresentations are in the context of a bona fide dispute and an adversarial negotiation between KrunchCash and Pursuit. In that context there can't be an actionable misrepresentation. There is no reliance, and KrunchCash and Hackman cannot allege an injury because they admit in the pleading that they filed those actions six months to a year before any of the alleged statements were made, and then

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they became defendants in those actions where they had an obligation to participate in those actions. That has nothing to do with anything Pursuit may or may not have said so, first, they couldn't induce them to participate in those cases.

Critically on the fraud claims there are no allegations against the individuals, Mr. Cohen and Mr. Turner. Instead the amended complaint tries to group plead them, but that doesn't, saying in general, you know, defendants did this, defendants did that, that does not satisfy CPLR 3016(e)'s requirement that requires particularized allegations tying each plaintiff's injury to actionable conduct by each defendant. Here there are no allegations against the individuals, and, in fact, the amended complaint doesn't even make clear which plaintiff was allegedly defrauded. So on these grounds alone the fraud claim should be dismissed.

Second, KrunchCash asserts that Pursuit breached a settlement agreement, that is, as I just explained, there can be no breach because there is no agreement, and here there was none. There was only the adversarial settlement negotiations with both sides conditioning settlement on a future writing, and that is critical. It is fatal to this claim under Amcan which is cited in our brief along with other First Department precedent, "Where the parties

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contemplate the final writing being a condition to settlement, there can be no settlement agreement in advance of that."

Turning to the -- and as to the individuals, again, there are no allegations that they were parties to any agreement much less breached one.

Moving on to the tortious interference cause of action, KrunchCash does not plead any actual contract or that it was breached so there can be no tortious interference with contract as a matter of law. As to their allegation that in notifying a Connecticut Advance recipient of its legal positions, that Pursuit somehow tortiously interfered with prospective business relations, KrunchCash does not and cannot plead that Pursuit acted with malice.

In other words, --

THE COURT: They say the word.

MS. BEA: They say the word, but conclusory allegations are not enough because, first of all, we cite plenty of case law saying they have to specifically plead that that conduct, that malice based on factual pleading amounts to a separate crime or tort or that Pursuit acted solely to harm KrunchCash.

THE COURT: The word is not enough, but they allege, you know, essentially defamatory statements which can be the kind of conduct that triggers this kind of

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liability in some cases.

MS. BEA: In theory, but defamation is special.

Under CPLR 3016(a)'s pleading requirement, in order to state a claim for defamation you have to specify the precise statement you're alleging is defamatory. They didn't even attach the letter that they keep referencing to the complaint. We did to our motion at Exhibit E so you can review it. You will see that under the body of law for defamation it is a letter which expresses legal positions articulated in the context of litigation, and because of that it cannot be defamatory. It's being sent under the litigation privilege, and there is no dispute that that's the context it was sent in.

Again, as to the individuals, no allegations to support any cause of action against them here, and certainly nothing that would give rise to individual liability for any of these alleged tortious interference activities.

THE COURT: Well, the company acts through some human beings, right, so who else, who were sending these letters?

MS. BEA: The letter states, literally the first sentence, "My firm represents Pursuit." It's unequivocal, it's not being sent on behalf of individuals, and to attach individual liability in the context where, yes, it has to act through principals, clearly if you look at the letter

which we have submitted as documentary evidence or even when you look at the e-mails that KrunchCash and Mr. Hackman allege are a settlement agreement, they're acting on behalf of Pursuit at all times. That's really not disputable or disputed.

In order to try to resurrect some of the claims against the individuals, in their opposition papers the defendants, the plaintiffs in this case, KrunchCash, says, oh, but there was a conspiracy, they acted in a conspiracy to commit fraud, to commit tortious interference, and to breach a contract.

First of all, there can be no conspiracy, it's not a separate cause of action without the underlying cause of action. I have already explained why these causes of action fail. More importantly, to plead a conspiracy requires, again, specific elements which I am happy to walk the Court through, we spell them out in our reply papers, but it's clear as it is with the rest of the complaint, there are no specific allegations that Mr. Cohen or Mr. Turner conducted themselves in any way that could be conceivably called a conspiracy, much less in any of the underlying claims.

I think, unless the Court has -THE COURT: No, that's very helpful.
Let me hear from Mr. Berg, please.
Thank you.

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MR. BERG: Your Honor, I just want to say one
thing briefly about the declaratory judgment issue. The
cases that they cite are when there's a race to the
courthouse, as your Honor mentioned. This is different. We
filed in November of 2021. This court got jurisdiction over
this dispute first. They filed in, I believe, it was
certainly 2022, and it was after they went to Florida.

THE COURT: The Florida case was before your case?

MR. BERG: No.

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THE COURT: It was not?

MR. BERG: There was an arbitration filed in Florida. The arbitration never got jurisdiction over us. We came to your Honor in an Article 75 proceeding. Then after the Article 75 proceeding, after you ruled preliminarily, they went to Florida, and filed, and lost on jurisdictional grounds.

THE COURT: They brought the first lawsuit raising these claims, then you tried to amend your petition to bring the same claims here?

MR. BERG: First we tried to amend the petition -- you're right, I'm sorry, they did file in Florida first, --

THE COURT: That's my point.

MR. BERG: -- but the jurisdiction is what matters. When the Court gets jurisdiction over the dispute, that's what matters. That turns on first filed.

Let me move on.

The declaratory judgment statute is also incredibly broad, and we cite it in our brief.

As to -- let me start with tortious interference. We quote in paragraphs 80 and 81 of our complaint in detail what can only be described as malice because the letter that was referenced says, A, KrunchCash and KC PCRD are the same, that's false, B, KrunchCash improperly intercepted Pursuit's money when KrunchCash and the Connecticut confidential party were the only parties to the contract under which KrunchCash received that money. Then they go on to say don't you dare pay KrunchCash any more, we are a creditor. All of that is false.

THE COURT: Did the underlying party breach the contract with you?

MR. BERG: Not yet, but here's the point: They said don't pay a penny to KrunchCash in the future, and we don't know yet. We have to discover --

THE COURT: So you don't have a tort yet.

MR. BERG: Well, we do because they said in the future don't pay KrunchCash. We get to discover hopefully whether that turned out to be true or not, whether the Connecticut folks actually sent them money, withheld money, or did something else.

THE COURT: You don't get to plead a claim and

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then	hope	to	fin	d	out	whet	ther	it's	tru	ie (	or 1	not,	you	ı have	e to
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MR. BERG: I don't as I stand here, you're right, I don't.

THE COURT: And damages, by definition then you don't, you can't allege damages either because you don't know.

MR. BERG: Let me add one thing. I don't know, so if your Honor is going to dismiss the claim I would ask that it be done without prejudice because we then could find out later that the third party's paying Pursuit, and Pursuit's misrepresented, in our view, that they are a creditor, and we improperly got paid, and none of that is true.

THE COURT: Then you would have a different complaint.

MR. BERG: I would.

THE COURT: Okay.

Prospective business relationship, the same?

MR. BERG: The same arguments. I mean, the prospective, I would hope, would stay in the case because it's prospective, and it's not a matter of whether there's a breach currently.

THE COURT: You still have to show, in that situation you have to show that you have been harmed. In

other words, there has to be some relationship that was going to happen that didn't happen. You're still -- this is all still happening.

MR. BERG: It is.

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THE COURT: So, you know, it's like bringing a case about an operation that is still going on.

MR. BERG: That's fair.

THE COURT: Don't you have to wait until you see how it pans out?

MR. BERG: I would respectfully suggest that we don't because we don't know what is going on yet.

THE COURT: Well, if you have independently tortious behavior, those are where you bring preliminary injunction suits and the like, but here you are bringing a tort claim about something that might happen.

Now for a prospective business relationship tort you have to show essentially that there was resulting injury to the business relationship, that's a fundamental element of the tort, and if that still has not happened yet, then you don't have a tort yet.

MR. BERG: To be fair, it has not happened yet, we don't know.

THE COURT: Right, okay.

And the other, the last claim was the fraud claim?

MR. BERG: Yeah, the fraud claim can be simplified

by reference to paragraphs 70 through 74 in the following sense: They first said that all of our allegations revolved around oral communications. That's not the case. Then they second said the settlement agreement can't be the basis of fraud because there are promises in the future.

We also allege that the false statements were in e-mails in paragraphs 70 through 74 in which the plaintiffs, including Mr. Cohen, I am including Mr. Turner, we allege conspired to achieve the following: They didn't want us to walk away from the plaintiffs' claims in Maryland, and they said we will pay presently, which lead to the settlement agreement, which lead to, in our view, a meeting of the minds, and so we pled in the alternative either the settlement agreement is enforceable or you have committed fraud because you never had any intention to pay us.

THE COURT: Statements that you're going to reach an agreement and then you don't are not -- you can't have a fraud claim based on let's try to negotiate a deal and then it doesn't work out.

MR. BERG: This is not an agreement to agree, this is different. This is, we will pay for the lawsuits. They started to pay for the lawsuits.

THE COURT: They will pay for them if there is an agreement, right?

MR. BERG: No, they started to pay for them before

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there was any agreement.	They	stopped	l paying	for	them.	We
said we are going to walk	away	from th	nese cla	ims,	and th	ney
came back and said, oh, we	e will	l start	paying	you (	again,	for
sure we will pay you again	n.					

That is in an e-mail which they don't address. That is a present promise based also on past conduct. That's not an agreement to agree. That is paragraphs 70 through 74.

THE COURT: The thing that you say did not occur are the future payments that you're saying they promised to make, but did not.

MR. BERG: Yes, that's true except that the promises were reduced to writing that they would pay, not that they would pay in the future, but that they would pay.

THE COURT: That's either a contract or it isn't.

It's not -- if somebody says, look, I promise you I will pay these claims, and let's assume it's not a contract for whatever reason, you can't make it into a fraud claim because it didn't turn into a contract.

MR. BERG: No, no, no, that's not what I'm saying.

THE COURT: So what's the false statement upon which they relied that I am going to make these payments pursuant to an agreement that we hope to ink with you?

MR. BERG: Let me tell you what was done in reliance: KrunchCash did not walk away from the

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litigations, it continued to fund the litigations not because it had an obligation, we could have gone to the other side at any point and say, everybody, walk away, and the only reason KrunchCash kept funding is because of this promise and these series of promises that lasted from when they stopped paying in 2020, they started promising almost immediately that they were going to participate, that got reduced to writing, and we said, fine, we will continue on with the litigation. That is reliance, that's justifiable reliance.

In addition, Mr. Hackman day to day dedicated his time, his time to these litigations, and Pursuit said you deserve to be paid for that, reduced to writing.

THE COURT: Anything further, Ms. Bea?

MS. BEA: Yes, quickly.

THE COURT: Five minutes.

MS. BEA: First of all, if your Honor would look at those paragraphs cited by Mr. Berg, 70 through 74, in subparts what they are really talking about is a July 2021 e-mail attached as Exhibit D to our motion papers which you can look at as documentary evidence because they do reference it in the complaint and incorporate it. You can read for yourself that what is expressed in there is settlement negotiations, nothing more. There's a dispute about terms, there's a dispute about what Pursuit gets in

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exchange for potentially committing some of this funding, and none of that was resolved.

CPLR 2014 requires, by the way, that out-of-court settlement agreements have to be in writing and subscribed by the parties in order to be binding, and there's also case law that we cited to you from the First Department that says when it comes to these kind of situations where the agreement lacks essential terms and where the parties anticipate a subsequent writing there can be no agreement.

I think that when you look at it through the lens of fraud in which the particulars are not alleged and certainly not as to the individuals, so there's other pleading issues that are already outlined for you or you look at it through the lens of breach of contract, when you look at the e-mail they rely on you will see pending review of your draft settlement agreement, your wish list does not match my understanding, we are almost on the same page, we should enter into a funding agreement, don't know how to resolve this, will have to agree to that in final documentation. These are negotiations, nothing more, they fell apart, and we are in litigation in part because of that.

So you know how this story unfolded so far, but when you go back and look at the e-mails and what was unfolding, again, then I think you will see there can be no

justifiable reliance or agreement.

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THE COURT: Okay. I will take a short break. I will be right back.

(A recess was taken.)

(After the recess the following occurred:)

THE COURT: Here are my decisions on the two motions.

First, the discovery motion in the 651070/2022 matter, I'm going to grant the motion to compel subject to me locating and then signing the confidentiality order which neither Ms. Klinger or I were entirely sure we knew where they were, but we will find it. I'm not sure exactly why. Normally we sign those pretty quickly so it must have slipped through somehow.

I think when you are dealing with a situation like this, the tracing of funds is a very complex task. I agree with the arguments that have been made that, you know, again, I'm not certainly presupposing that the defendant, that KrunchCash did anything wrong, but the allegation is there, and if it is of the ilk that has been described, redaction would be a very easy way to gloss over it. So the only way to actually do a muscular job of trying to trace this through is to have everything. So I think the time period, and the scope, and the no redaction, all ordered, subject to there being the opportunity to mark it as

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"attorneys' eyes only" including expert who are hired by the attorneys.

So if we have trouble locating the proposed confidentiality order, we will let you know. It's hard to describe the amount of inbound communications we receive, and we don't, I'm sorry to say, sit and monitor everything that comes in, in all the cases. So it may be that I've already reminded you of this, but if you have a situation, and I am not casting the blame on any of you, but if you have a situation where the failure for to us get to and sign a confidentiality order is getting in the way, feel free to e-mail us and let us know, we won't be upset by that. We try the best we can.

So motion three in that action is granted.

Now moving on to motion three in the other action, 656688/2021, that motion is also granted. I will go claim by claim.

The fraud claim, the first cause of action,

KrunchCash alleges essentially that defendants never had an intention of honoring their oral and written commitments to compensate KrunchCash for its time in managing all of the Maryland and Florida litigation or reimbursing KrunchCash for all legal fees and expenses incurred in the LB Pharma litigations after December 2020. That's from the first amended complaint, paragraphs 73 and 74. Plaintiff relies

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on an oral agreement and a phone call where defendants purportedly committed to pay costs and expenses related to the litigation which they say were reiterated and confirmed in an e-mail. In April 2021 the parties entered into settlement negotiations over the litigation expenses, but based on the information that's in the record the LB Pharma settlement was never agreed upon or executed.

The allegations are inadequate to state a fraud claim. Putting aside the fact that it does not plead it with the requisite specificity and does not have any allegations as to the individuals, a cause of action for fraud cannot be predicated on statements which are contractual or promissory in nature and relate to future actions or conduct. There are many cases I could cite for that, but I will cite one, the Chimento case, 208 A.D.2d 385 [First Department 1994]. So it's the alternative version of the claim that is casted as fraud, I think, is inadequate. It is either statements that are in anticipation of a potential contract which turns us to the next claim which is the third cause of action for breach of contract, breach of the LB Pharma settlement agreement.

To the extent that plaintiff alleges in the alternative that all material terms were agreed to in the LB Pharma portion of the settlement, the e-mails exchanged that are in the record about the settlement belie conclusively

that claim or undermine conclusively that claim.

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First, as alleged in the complaint, the LB Pharma settlement was rejected by Pursuit. The submission of a draft redline document in and of itself does not demonstrate there was a meeting of the minds on all essential terms, and in the June 2021 e-mail exchanges between Hackman and Cohen which plaintiffs' claim embodies the agreement make it clear that no agreement was reached.

As counsel pointed out, the e-mail, which is captioned "Some thoughts from our discussions" illustrates that the parties were "making progress", and were "almost on the same page," but "didn't exactly match my understanding." Further, Hackman wrote that any settlement was pending review of Pursuit's draft settlement document, and as a legal matter where the parties anticipate that a signed writing is required, there is no contract until one is delivered, at least in a situation where the allegations don't indicate a meeting of the minds on material terms. So the third causes of action is dismissed.

Moving to the second cause of action which relates to the tortious interference with contract and prospective business relationships, we went through that in some detail during the argument. The plaintiffs allege that defendants' January 7, 2022 letter to the Connecticut law firm constitutes tortious interference. The claim alleges

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tortious interference with an existing contract for Pursuit purportedly interfering with the Connecticut Advance, and with the prospective business relationship or interfering with a confidential party with whom KrunchCash has done business for many years.

Starting with the interference with contract, that fails because plaintiff fails to allege defendants' intentional procurement of a third-party breach of that contract without justification and damages. Nowhere does plaintiff allege that there was a breach of this third-party contract as discussed during the argument. That is not known at this point so the claim must be dismissed.

Although on a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint should be construed liberally to avoid dismissal of a tortious interference with contract claim, a plaintiff must support his claim with more than mere speculation. That's a quote from Ferrandino case, 82 A.D.3d 1035 [Second Department 2011].

The prospective business relationship claim fails for similar reasons. To state a claim the plaintiff must allege a specific business relationship with an identified third party with which the defendants interfered. The plaintiff must plead more culpable conduct than required for tortious interference with existing contracts, and here plaintiff alleged that defendants maliciously sent the

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Connecticut firm a letter entitled "Notice of Creditor Claim to Proceeds" which allegedly contained false and defamatory statements about the relationship between KrunchCash and Pursuit, but even assuming that could be sufficient to allege some of the conduct elements, and I don't think it is, plaintiff has, once again, failed to allege a resulting injury as discussed during the argument. At this point there's a potential harm, I suppose, to the relationship, but nothing has come to fruition. So, you know, if and when there are new facts that go beyond what has been pled, then plaintiffs can try again, I suppose, but the current version of the claim is clearly premature.

Finally, the declaratory judgment claims: I think that Pursuit has the better of the argument here. It's a tangled and circuitous route through the various court systems, but the bottom line is that Pursuit was the first entity to go to court with these claims, the affirmative version of these claims which there is a bias toward having the normal order of things where a plaintiff brings a claim seeking relief against a defendant. A declaratory judgment, which is, you know, appropriate in many, many circumstances, is oftentimes in the context that we are talking about here, one where a defendant is facing a threat of a lawsuit and is seeking to get the court to sort of quiet title, for lack of a better phrase. Here there is no reason for that because

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we have these same claims in their natural state in front of me.

Now, again, it began in Florida. The response to that was to abandon Florida where the claim by Pursuit was brought in court to bring its affirmative claims some on the topics addressed in the declaratory judgment action. response to that was to bring the instant action here. the claims by Pursuit were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds and then moved here. So we are now all here in New York in front of me with the natural version of the claim, plaintiff versus defendant, and the defenses' version of the claim where KrunchCash brought it ostensibly to have the issue resolved so that it does not leave a cloud over its head, but there's no need for it any more. So even though KrunchCash was, strictly speaking, the first to file in New York court, KrunchCash's claims still mirror Pursuit's claims, and there is no need especially given consolidation to have both versions of the declaratory judgment claims move forward, both the natural version, plaintiff versus defendant, and the declaratory judgment version.

"As courts in New York have found, where there is another action pending which when tried will dispose of all the issues involved in the declaratory judgment action, the Court should not in the exercise of discretion entertain an action for declaratory judgment." That's a quote from the

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Thor Gallery case, 35 Misc.3d 1215(A) [Supreme Court New York County 2012]. Again, here these same issues will be resolved in the tandem case in front of me, that's the 651070/2022 case. So KrunchCash's declaratory judgment claims are duplicative and dismissed.

The parties do not appear to oppose consolidation of the two competing actions so I will grant that motion.

I believe I've dismissed most, I think all of the substantive claims in the KrunchCash action so I'm not sure that it matters, but to the extent that -- I will grant the motion to consolidate. Judgment has not been entered yet. They may seek leave to amend, I don't know, but I think the proper course is to consolidate them into the 2022 -- I am not sure how to consolidate them now, into what, but is the idea to have a single NYSCEF number or just have the two cases independently just jointly for trial?

MR. BERG: I think the idea would be to consolidate them now in their action, now that you have ruled.

THE COURT: Right, exactly. I am not ever sure of the mechanics of what I have to order for it to happen, but they will be consolidated into the 651070/2022 number in which Pursuit is the plaintiff, which is the natural order of things, for the, you know, punitive declaratory judgment claims anyway, and obviously if KrunchCash wants to convert

	Proceedings
1	any claims into counterclaims, it can proceed to do that.
2	That will simplify things.
3	Is there anything I need to deal with besides what
4	I have done?
5	MR. BERG: No your Honor. Thank you.
6	MS. BEA: No, your Honor. Thank you.
7	THE COURT: I would ask you to order the

transcript. My written order, as you probably have seen, will incorporate that by reference.

With that I wish you a good day.

Thank you.

Thank you for your time, your Honor. MS. BEA:

Thank you. MR. BERG:

\* \* \*

#### CERTIFICATE

I, Terry-Ann Volberg, C.S.R., an official court reporter of the State of New York, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of my stenographic notes.



Terry-Ann Volberg, CSR, CRR Official Court Reporter

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